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ence of either party has contributed to the loss, it should be borne
by that party in the whole or in the greater part. Devlin L.J. had
in mind the analogy of the contributory negligence acts . If such a
rule had been adopted in Newtons' case, it would probably have
been held that the plaintiffs had been negligent in releasing the car
to a complete stranger and that it was therefore just that they
should bear the whole loss . An apportionment rule would cause
hardship to the innocent third party in cases where the person entrusted with possession :of the goods is a "professional", and this
is why the writer suggests that it should be :confined to private
transactions.
All of these suggestions presuppose that :no system of registration, certificate of title, or other equivalent system for giving notice
of proprietary interests has been established for the particular class
of transaction in question . If such a system has been established,
as it has been, for example, in the case of security interests, and it
is not unreasonable to.expect third parties to make an appropriate
search before treating the person in possesson as an unqualified
owner, then there is no need to engraft additional rules.;on the
system .
JACOB S . ZIEGEL -`

CONFLICT OF LAWS-ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE VOID Ab ZnitioJURISDICTION OF COURT OF "WIFE'S" DOMICILE-RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN DECREE-RECIPROCITY-RIGHT OF PARTY WHO HAS
INVOKED FOREIGN JURISDICTION TO QUESTION THAT JURISDICTION
AND DENY VALIDITY OF DECREE .-Re Capon, Capon and O'Brien
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the field
v . ldcLay,l

a

of recognition of foreign nullity decrees deserves to be noted as it
clarifies some important common law principles, applies for the
first time in Ontario Travers v. Holley 2 and reaffirms other rules
in the field of conflict of laws.
The court was of the opinion that :
1. In the case of a marriage void ab initio, the putative wife
does not automatically acquire the putative husband's domicile.
She is free to acquire a domicile of choice different from his, and
*Jacob S, Ziegel, of the College of Law, University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon.
1 [196512 0 .12 . 83 (C .A.) .
2 [1953] P . 246, [195312 All E .R.794.
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in seeking an annulment may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
of that domicile .
II. The courts of Ontario are entitled to assume jurisdiction
to annul a marriage void ab initio on the ground that the petitioner
alone is domiciled in the province whether or not the marriage was
celebrated in Ontario.
III. The courts of Ontario will recognize a foreign nullity decree rendered on a jurisdictional basis similar to their own and
will not review such a decree even though the putative husband
was domiciled in this province at the time of the commencement
of the proceedings.
IV. A putative wife cannot impugn the validity of a nullity
decree obtained by her from a court the jurisdiction of which she
herself invoked and on the basis of which she acted by subsequently remarrying .
Although propositions I and II were made by the court in
solving a hypothetical case they were relevant in order to apply
Travers v. Holley and decide the suit. Proposition III contains the
ratio decidendi of the case whereas proposition IV is clearly obiter.
In 1952, Mr. Capon made a will in which he nominated his
mother sole executrix and directed that his whole estate be divided
equally between her and his sister . In 1957 he married in Toronto.
The "spouses" lived together until 1958 when, at the instance of
the "wife", the "husband" was committed to the Ontario Mental
Hospital . In 1959 she left Toronto and established a bona fide domicile in Nevada in accordance with the laws of this State and of
Ontario. She then instituted proceedings in Nevada against her
"husband" to have the marriage declared null and void ab initio
on the ground of his insanity at the time of the ceremony. Upon
obtaining a decree of nullity she remarried.
After Mr. Capon's death, and upon application for probate
of the will in Ontario where the deceased was domiciled, the Surrogate Court judge declared that the "wife" had failed to establish
that she was one of Mr. Capon's next-of-kin and admitted the will
to probate. The "wife" in the court of first instance and in the
Court of Appeal argued that the Nevada decree was made without
jurisdiction and could not affect her status in Ontario since she
had been domiciled in this province from the date of the "marriage" until her "husband's" death. According to section 20 of the
Wills Act,' the 1952 will was revoked by the 1957 marriage and he
died intestate. She was entitled to share in his estate as his lawful
R.S.O., 1960, c. 433.
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widow in accordance with the provisions of the Devolution of
Estates Act 4 as upon an intestacy despite the fact that she had invoked the foreign court's jurisdiction and obtained a decree of
nullity of her marriage.
The beneficiaries under the will relied on the Nevada decree
and maintained that Mr. Capon's lack of mental capacity at the
time of the ceremony made the marriage absolutely null and void
ab initio. It followed that his domicile did not automatically attach
to her. The putative wife retained the domicile she had at the time
of the marriage ceremony and was free to establish a domicile of
choice in Nevada and seek a declaration as to her status in the
courts of this State. Alternatively they argued that if the Nevada
decree was invalid, the wife, having invoked the jurisdiction of the
court of this State, could not now attack the validity of the decree .
The Court of Appeal after examining the relevant authorities
held that the Ontario marriage was void ab initio because of the
insanity of one of the parties at the time of the ceremony.
Nor. Justice Schroeder, who wrote the opinion of the court,
then stated that under the rules of international law recognized in
Ontario, the only court having jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment of divorce a vinculo matrimonii is that of the country in which
both parties were domiciled at the time of institution of proceedings and that the same rule applies to nullity cases where the marriage is merely voidable. The wife acquires the domicile of her
husband on marriage and retains it until a decree of avoidance is
pronounced by a competent tribunal. "This is not so in the case
of a marriage void ab initio, and to the extent that domicile may
be the criterion of the court's jurisdiction, the court from which a
decree of nullity is asked may be confronted by two litigants who
have not a common domicile but who have separate and different
domiciles." I If the putative wife lives with her putative husband
and acquires the same domicile, she acquires it as a domicile of
choice and not as a domicile of dependence . His lordship said : 6

Assuming the correctness of the facts proven by the appellant in the
Nevada suit, and assuming that at the date of institution of those
proceedings the appellant had acquired a domicile of choice in Nevada,
the point which falls to be determined is whether her domicile alone,
the defendant husband being then domiciled in the Province of Ontario,
° R.S.O ., 1960, c. 106.
1 Ibid.

a Supra,

footnote 1, at p. 92.
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invested the Nevada court with jurisdiction to pronounce the decree
of nullity herein .

To answer this question and be in a position to apply Travels
v. Holley 7 he examined the hypothetical case of a putative wife
domiciled in Ontario and seeking in an Ontario forum a decree of
nullity of a marriage void ab initio when the putative husband is
domiciled elsewhere at the date of the institution of the action .
after pointing out that the law upon this subject has long been in
an unsatisfactory state, Mr. Justice Schroeder found that in England, at common law, in the absence of a statute, it is established
by White (otherwise Bennett) v. White,$ De Reneville v. De Reneville,9 and supported by passages from the speeches of Lord Cohen
and Lord Guest in Ross Smith v. Ross Smith 1° that jurisdiction in
the case of a marriage void ab initio can properly be based on the
ground of the petitioning wife's domicile .
Turning to Canadian authorities the Court of Appeal disregarded Manella v. Manella,' 1 one of its previous decisions, as
well as Hutchings v. Hutchings, 12 decided by the Manitoba Court
of Appeal, mostly because they antedated De Reneville. 11 His Lordship preferred Spencer v. Ladd, Finlay v. Boettner" where Boyd
McBride J., of the Alberta Supreme Court, gave effect to the rule
laid down in the De Reneville case and held that the domicile of
the petitioner in the country of the forum was a valid basis for the
exercise of the court's jurisdiction .
Schroeder J.A . stated : 15
In my view the assumption of jurisdiction by the English courts in the
case of a void marriage is founded on sound reason, for if a void
marriage is a complete nullity and can properly be regarded in that
light by every court and by all persons, there can be no valid reason
for withholding recognition from a decree recording its non-existence
made by the forum of the country in which only one of the parties is
domiciled. To restrict jurisdictional recognition to the courts of the
country of the common domicile would result in the creation of an
intolerable situation in the case of a void marriage where the domicile
of the parties, as has been demonstrated, may be different . In such a

7 Supra, footnote 2 .
8 [19371 P. 111, [19371 1 All E .R . 708 .
9 [1948] P . 100, at pp . 112-113, [1948] 1 All E .R . 56, at p . 61 .
to [1963] A.C. 280, at pp . 310, 347-348, [1962] 1 All E .R . 344 (H.L.), at
pp. 359, 383 . See also Way v . Way, [1950] P. 71 rev. sub nom Kenward v.
Kenward, [1951] P . 124 ; Mehta v. Mehta, [194512 All E.R. 690 ; Apt v . Apt,
[19481 P. 83 (C.A .) ; Har-Shefi v. Har-Shell (No. 1), [1953] P . 161 .
11 [19421 O .R . 630 (C.A .), (194214 D .L.R . 712 .
11 [193014 D .L .R . 673, 39 Man . R . 66, [193012 W .W.R. 565 (C .A .) .
11 Supra, footnote 9 .
11 [19481 1 D.L .R. 39, [194712 W.W.R. 817 (Alta . S .C .) .
15 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 95 .
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case the problem ofjurisdiction would be hopelessly insoluble, leading
to the creation, as in the case at bar, of a deplorable condition in which
one of the parties would be regarded as married in one country and
unmarried in another.

and concluded that the courts of Ontario "would be entitled to
assume jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner alone is domiciled in this province whether the marraiage was celebrated here
or not". 11 To the authorities cited by the Ontario Court of Appeal
should be added Savelieff v. Glouchkoff, 17 a recent decision of the
ritish Columbia Court of Appeal supporting the same conclusion .
This part of the court's opinion is welcome as it clarifies the
law in a decisive manner even though the ratio decidendi of the case
is elsewhere. It seems now established by the Court of Appeal that
at common law, a "wife" domiciled in Ontario may petition the
courts of this province even though her "husband" is domiciled
elsewhere, where the ground on which the annulment of the marriage is sought renders it void ab initio . And it would not seem to
matter that the marriage was celebrated out of Ontario. Nor does
there appear to be any good reason to deny a like result in the converse case where the petitioner is resident in Ontario, the respondent being there domiciled. Actually "if the domicile of the petitioner alone is a sufficient jurisdictional ground, it would be difficult indeed to deny the sufficiency of the domicile of the respondent
alone" .ls In other words, where the marriage is void the Ontario
[bid., at p. 96.
(1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 767 (B .C.S.C .) and comment by J.-G . Castel
(1964), 42 Can. Bar Rev. 474, rev. on appeal (1964), 48 W.W.R. 335 and
comment by K. Lysyk (1965), 43 Can. Bar Rev. 107. See also Kahn v.
Kahn (1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 171, (1959), 29 W.W.R. 181 (B.C.S.C.) ; Ambrose v. Ambrose (Harnish v. Harnish) (1960), 32 W.W.R. 433, at p. 447 ;
Bevand v. Bevand, [1955] 1 D.L.R . 354 (INS.). One must assume that
Manella v. Manella, supra, footnote 11, is now overruled by Re Capon,
supra, footnote 1. Actually it is open to question whether Manella v.
Manella did reject the domicile of the petitioner as a valid ground for exercising nullity jurisdiction. The case involved a marriage alleged by the
plaintiff husband domiciled in Ontario to have been void ab initio on the
ground of the wife's insanity at the time of the ceremony. The Court of
Appeal held that the husband's failure "to obtain an order appointing a
guardian for the defendant wife who was a mental incompetent was fatal
and on that ground alone the plaintiff was disentitled to the relief which
he sought". See the words of Mr. Justice Schroeder in Re Capon distinguishing the case, at p. 95. Middleton J.A. in Manella stated however (at
p. 634 (O.R.)) that "I think it will be found that the wife did not change
her domicile by reason ofher husband's change of domicile, and that the
courts of this Province have no power to declare the invalidity" . This is
probably obiter in view of the judge's earlier position with respect to the
appointment of a guardian when the wife did not enter an appearance to
the writ of summons .
as See K. M. Lysyk, Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Decrees
in Nullity Suits (1964), 29 Sask. Bar Rev. 143, at p. 149.
16
H7
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courts should assume jurisdiction when either party is domiciled
in the province. Conferring jurisdiction upon the courts of the
petitioner's or the respondent's domicile, theoretically at least,
opens up the possibility of conflicting judgments by the courts of
the respective domiciles but this is to be preferred to a situation
where no court would have nullity jurisdiction, a result which
would follow if common domicile was insisted upon, the parties
being domiciled in different jurisdictions."
III
Relying upon the much publicized case of Travers v. Holley 2°
the Ontario Court of Appeal went on to say : "To deny the equivalent right to a foreign court would be inconsistent and contrary
to well recognized principles . . . ." 21
Travers v . Holley, it will be recalled, involved the recognition
of a divorce decree rendered by a court of New South Wales whose
jurisdiction was based on section 16(a) of the New South Wales
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1899 which provided as follows :"
Any wife who at the time of the institution of the suit has been domiciled in New South Wales for three years and upwards (provided she
did not resort to New South Wales for the purpose of such institution)
may present a petition to the court praying that her marriage be dissolved on one or more of the grounds following : (a) that her husband
has without just cause or excuse wilfully deserted the petitioner and
without any such cause or excuse left her continuously so deserted
during three years and upwards and no wife who was domiciled in New
South Wales when the desertion commenced shall be deemed to have
lost her domicile by reason only of her husband having thereafter acquired a foreign domicile .

In this case the English Court of Appeal held that a foreign divorce
obtained by a wife in circumstances substantially similar to those
in which English courts exercise jurisdiction under section 13 of
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937 23 will be recognized in England,
although the husband was not domiciled in the foreign country
at the commencement of the divorce proceedings. Since the New
South Wales court had assumed jurisdiction under a local statute
identical to the English Act the court upheld the validity of the
decree.
12 De Reneville v. De Reneville, supra, footnote 9, per Lord Greene
M.R ., at p . 113 (P) .
10 Supra, footnote 2.
21 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 96 .
21 62 & 63 Vict., No . 15 . Now see Matrimonial Causes Act (Commonwealth) 1959, No . 104 .
2a 1 Edw . 8 & 1 Geo . 6, c . 57 now found in the Act of 1950, s . 18(1)(a),
infra, footnote 28 .
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Hodson L.J. said :"

I would say that, where, as here, there is in substance reciprocity, it
would be contrary to principle and inconsistent with comity if the
courts of this country were to refuse to recognize a jurisdiction which
mutatis mutandis they claim for themselves . The principle laid down
and followed since Le Mesurier case must, I think, be interpreted in
the light of the legislation which has extended the power ofthe courts of
this country in the case ofpersons not domiciled here.

It is important to underline the distinction that exists between a
decree of divorce pronounced upon a common law ground of
jurisdiction and one given on the basis of a deserted wife statute .
At common law, the actual domicile of the husband at the time
when the proceedings are commenced is the sole test of jurisdiction. This test was established by the Eriviy Council in Le Mesurier
v. Le Mesurier.25 In 1937, 26 and in 1949 2'-1950 2$ the common law
grounds on which an English court might assume jurisdiction to
dissolve or annul a marriage were extended by statute so that the
wife can now institute divorce proceedings in England notwithstanding the foreign domicile of her husband if certain conditions
laid out in the legislation are met.
At common law, the fundamental doctrine respecting the
recognition of foreign decrees of divorce in England follows the
same pattern. Nothing short of domicile enables a foreign court
to pronounce a decree that will be recognized in England." However, if the court of the domicile recognizes the jurisdiction of a
court of another country, a decree given by the latter is valid in
England. 3° Travers v. Holley 31 predicates a statutory extension of
common law jurisdiction beyond the domicile. The common law
doctrine of recognition which was developed before the passage
of the 1937 and 1949-1950 Acts and indeed before the English
courts themselves had divorce jurisdiction" was extended and
modified in Travers v. Holley so as to permit recognition of a
foreign decree based jurisdictionally upon some ground other than
domicile, provided that the facts that existed before the foreign
court would have enabled the English court to take jurisdiction
under the above mentioned legislation. It is in connection with
Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 257 (P.), 800 (All E.R.). Italics mine.
[1895] A.C. 517 (P.C.).
26 Supra, footnote 23.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 12, 13, 14 Geo. 6,
c. 100.
21 Matrimonial Causes Act, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25.
29 See Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, supra, footnote 25.
afi Armitage v. Aft. Gen., [19061 P. 135.
81 Supra, footnote 2.
82 See Dicey's Conflict of Laws (7th ed., 1959), pp. 318-319 .
24
26
27

654

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[VOL . XL111

this statutory extension of the common law jurisdiction that Mr.
Justice Hodson said : "Where, as here, there is in substance reciprocity . . .".
In Canada the principle laid down in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier 3s has been unanimously approved by the courts ." Furthermore the decision of the Privy Council in A.-G. for Alberta v.
Cook" to the effect that a wife deserted by her husband cannot
acquire a domicile separate from his so as to give the court of that
domicile jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage even though she was
judicially separated from him led to the enactment by Parliament
in 1930 of the Divorce Jurisdiction Act" which provides in section
2 that "a married woman who whether before or after the passing
of the Act has been deserted by and has been living separate and
apart from her husband for a period of two years and upwards and
is still living separate and apart from her husband may, in any of
those provinces in Canada in which there is a court having jurisdiction to grant a divorce a vinculo matrintonü, commence in the
court of such province having jurisdiction proceedings for a divorce
a vinculo matrinronii praying that her marriage may be dissolved
on any grounds that may entitle her to such divorce according to
the law of such province, and such court has jurisdiction to grant
such divorce if immediately prior to such desertion the husband of
such married woman was domiciled in the province in which such
proceedings are commenced" . The Act applies only to wives deserted in Canada and where the proceedings are commenced in the
province where the husband was domiciled immediately prior to
desertion.
Clearly this legislation constitutes a departure from common
law rules and must be compared to similar legislation elsewhere,
especially in England and Australia. 37 Here is the proper field of
application of Travers v. Holley.3a
as Supra, footnote 25 .
34
For a survey see J.-G. Castel, Divorce Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Decrees in Canada, p. 126, of 1965 Supplement to
Cases, Notes and Materials on the Conflict of Laws (1960) .
36
?6 [19261 A.C. 444 (P .C .).
R.S.C., 1952, c. 84 .
37 See u4pra, footnote 22 and Z. Cowen and D. Mendes da Costa .
Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction (1961) .
33 Note however that Travers v. Holley has been interpreted widely
by English courts . The foreign statutory law need not correspond to the
English Matrimonial Causes Act. The English court will not compare laws
but merely ascertain whether in roughly comparable circumstances it would
have acted. See Arnold, [1957] 1 All E.R. 570; Carr v. Carr, [1955] 2 All
E.R . 61 ; Levett v. Smith, [1957] 1 All E.R . 720 ; Manning v. Afanning, [1958]
P. 112. Comparison does not require an exact identity of details but substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction . It is not essential for
recognition in England that the foreign court should assume jurisdiction
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When foreign divorce decrees are sought to be recognized in
Canada, our courts have also generally followed the rules adopted
in England in similar cases. Although domicile is still the only basis
for recognizing foreign divorces in all the provinces by virtue of
the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le
Mesurier," some Canadian courts have adopted- the reasoning of
Armitage v. Att.-Gen.4° and Travers v. Holley . 4t
Thus, recently, in Re Allarle, 42 it was held by the Alberta Supreme Court that a divorce decree granted in England under the
"deserted wife" jurisdiction conferred by section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 43 should be recognized in Alberta on the
basis that the courts of this province are entitled to assume substantially similar jurisdiction under the provisions of the Divorce
Jurisdiction Act of 1930.44 The court quoting Travers v. Holley
said that it would be contrary to principle and inconsistent with
comity if the courts of Alberta were to refuse to recognize a jurisdiction which mutatis mutandis they claim for themselves . 4s
Travers v. Holley was not followed in La Pierre v. Walter 46 on
the ground that the Act of 1930 which was also invoked in this
case, did not make any provision whatever in regard to the recognition of foreign decrees of divorce. The. court observed that, had
it been the intention of the Canadian Parliament that the law as
to the recognition offoreign decrees should also be changed, some
provision to this effect would have been included in the Act.
In Ontario the applicability of the doctrine of Travers v. Holley
to foreign decrees of divorces has not yet been tested but in the
light of the present decision one must assume that the Court of
Appeal would be prepared to consider it as part of the law of
Ontario. If the principle of Travers v. Holley now applies to foreign
nullity decrees, there is no reason why it should not be equally
on the grounds laid down by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 . It is sufficient that the facts exist which would have enabled the English courts to
assume jurisdiction . Robinson v. Robinson Scott, [1958] P . 71 .
3s Supra, footnote 25 .
40 Supra, footnote 30 .
48 (1964), 41 D .L .A. (2d) 553
41 Supra, footnote 2.
.
43 ,supra, footnote 23 .
44 Supra, footnote 36.
45
See also Rednar and Rednar v. Deputy Registrar General 'of Vital
Statistics (1960), 24 D .L.A . (2d) 238 (Alta .) ; Pledge v. Walter (1961-62),
36 W .W .A. 95 (Alta .) ; Yeger (otherwise Jaeger) and Duder v . Registrar
General ofVital Statistics (1958), 26 W.W .A. 651 (Alta .) .
46 (1960), 31 W .W.R. 26 (Alta .) . Actually in this case, Travers v. Holley
could not have been applied as the legislation under which the foreign
decree was granted did not correspond at all to the Canadian Act of 1930.
The circumstances in which the wife petitioned in the foreign country were
not sufficiently similar to the circumstances in which, in a like case, she
could have petitioned in Canada .
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applied to foreign judgments of divorce or to other forms of matrimonial relief.
Except for the present case, there is to my knowledge no other
judicial authority in Canada extending Travers v. Holley to foreign
annulment proceedings ."
In England in the case of a void marriage, recent decisions seem
to indicate that the courts will recognize the international validity
of a nullity decree granted by the courts of the country in which
the petitioner alone was domiciled. It is interesting to note that on
several occasions, divorce cases have been relied upon in nullity
proceedings . In Abate v. Cauvin (Abate) 4s the court cited Arnaitage
v. Att .-Gen 49 and held that an English court will recognize the
validity of a decree of nullity pronounced by a foreign court if that
decree is recognized by the court of the country where the parties
were domiciled at the time of the proceedings . If Travers v. Holley ,
is law in Ontario, a fortiori there is no reason why the courts of
this province should not extend Arnaitage v. Att .-Gen . to nullity
cases when domicile is a relevant jurisdictional ground .
In Lepre v. Lepreb° Sir Jocelyn Simon specifically referred to
Travers v. Holley . He said :"
But even if this marriage were void ipso jure, so that the husband alone
was domiciled in Malta at the start of the proceedings there, in my
judgment we should still accord recognition to the Maltese decree. In
the case of a marriage void ipso jure, such as a marriage fundamentally
defective as to formalities, the English court assumes jurisdiction in
nullity if the petitioner alone is domiciled in England : De Reneville v .
De Reneville, [1948] 1 All E.R. 56, [1948] P. 100 ; Apt (orse . Magnets)
v . Apt, [1947] 2 All E.R. 677, [1948] P. 83 ; Kenward v. Kenward, [1950]
2 All E.R. 297, [1951] P. 124, to cite only authorities in the Court of
Appeal. Moreover, in such circumstances we purport to operate on
the status not only of the petitioner who is domiciled within the jurisdiction but also of the respondent who is not ; it is for this reason that
we insist that he or she should be made a party to the proceedings, so
as to be bound by our decree. If we ourselves claim a ground of jurisdiction we must concede a similar ground of jurisdiction to foreign
courts : Travers v . Holley and Holley, [1953] 2 All E.R. 794, [1953]
P . 246 ; Corbett v . Corbett, [195711 All E.R. 621 . Therefore even if the
wife were, contrary to my view, domiciled in England at the start of
the Maltese proceedings by reason of the nullity of the marriage, we
should none the less concede recognition to the Maltese decree, because
47 In Le Blanc v . Le Blanc, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 676, the Nova Scotia Court
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes applied erroneously, in my opinion,
the Divorce Jurisdiction Act to proceedings brought by a deserted wife for
the annulment of a voidable marriage .
'e [1961] 1 All E.R. 569, [1961] P. 29 (P.D.A.).
49
°° [1963] 2 All E .R. 49 (P.D .A.) .
Supra, footnote 30 .
51 Ibid., at pp . 55-57 .
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we would regard ourselves as competent to pronounce a decree of
nullity of a marriage void ipso jure were the husband domiciled in
England and the wife in Malta . . . . Furthermore such assumption and
concession of a binding jurisdiction in nullity based on the domicil of
one party only seems to me to accord with principle . A judgment
declaratory of the status of some subject-matter legally situated within
the national [sic] and jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the judgment constitutes a judgment in rem which is universally conclusive .
The husband was legally situated within the jurisdiction of the Maltese
court because he was domiciled in Malta . That court was, therefore,
competent to declare his status by a decree of nullity ; such a decree
constitutes a judgment in rem, and should be regarded universally as
conclusive as to his status, that is to say, that he is unmarried . . ., .
Therefore, in my judgment, we should accept the Maltese decree as
binding and conclusive-primarily as a decree of the court of the common domicil at the commencement of the proceedings there, though
alternatively as a decree of the husband's domicil alone at that timeprovided always that it is not vitiated by fraud or contrary to natural
justice .

I3is lordship refused to recognize the Maltese decree on the ground
that it offended grossly against the forum's notions of justice.52
The difficulty in applying Travers v. Holley to nullity cases is
that, in Ontario, unlike in England or elsewhere, there are no
statutory provisions dealing with the nullity jurisdiction of domestic courts . At present I believe that Travers v. Holley should be
invoked in Canada only in divorces involving factual situations
substantially similar to those covered by the 1930 Divorce Jurisdiction Act."

52 Cf. Chapelle v . Chapelle, [1950] 1 All E .R. 236 . Note that
Travers v .
Holley has been applied to foreign nullity decrees rendered on the basis
of residence or place of celebration of the marriage : Merker v. Merker,
(196213 All E .R . 928 (P.D .A .) especially at pp . 934-935 . For an earlier case
see Mitford v. Mitford and von Kuhlmann, [1923] P. 130, [1923] All E.R.
214.. In Corbett v. Corbett, (195711 All E .R. 621 (P .D .A .) Barnard J. recognized the validity of a foreign nullity decree rendered by the court of the
place of celebration of a void marriage . He did not refer to Travers v.
Holley but, after pointing out that it is well established that the celebration
of a void marriage in England, as distinct from a voidable marriage, is
sufficient to confer nullity jurisdiction on the English courts, stated : "It
would be wholly illogical in those circumstances to refuse to recognize a
similar jurisdiction exercised by the courts of a foreign country ." (at p.
623). For a general survey see K . Lysyk, loc. cit., supra, footnote 18 .
53 Supra, footnote 36 . See also Dicey, op. cit., footnote 32, p . 382 : "It
is submitted that great caution should be exercised before English
courts extend the grounds on which foreign nullity, decrees will be recognised in England. At first sight it might seem reasonable to concede
jurisdiction to foreign courts on the same grounds as those on which
English courts exercise jurisdiction, perhaps by way of analogy from the
principle of Travers v . Holley in divorce. This may be unobjectionable if
the grounds on which foreign decrees are recognised are limited to those
on which English courts exercise jurisdiction to annul voidable marriages .
It is otherwise, however, if foreign decrees are recognised whenever the
circumstances are such that English courts would have jurisdiction to annul
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Of course since Canadian courts assume nullity jurisdiction on
the basis of the domicile of the petitioner alone in the case of void
marriages, it would be incongruous that the equivalent right of
foreign courts should be denied. As Dr. Cheshire points out : sa
"If a void marriage is a complete nullity and can be so treated by
every court and every private person, what possible reason can
there be for refusing recognition to a decree recording its nonexistence and granted in the domicile of one of the parties?"" He
also states elsewhere: "If the law is to be a harmonious whole it
seems that what is regarded as sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the English court should be equally effective in the case of
foreign courts" ." In the present case however the jurisdictional
ground involved is established by common law and not by statute.
Without having to rely upon Travers v. Holley, especially in a
nullity case, the Ontario Court of Appeal could have reached the
same conclusion by simply pointing out that a foreign decree made
by the court of the domicile of the petitioner is entitled at common
law to recognition in Ontario. It would be wholly illogical at common law to refuse to recognize a similar jurisdiction exercised by
the courts of a foreign country."
As the Ontario Court of Appeal pointed out, at common law,
one of the established bases of jurisdiction for the annulment of
a void marriage is the domicile of the petitioner ; thus it seems only
sensible and appropriate that recognition should be accorded to a
foreign decree which was based on a similar jurisdictional ground.
This is not an application of the doctrine of Travers v. Holley which
supports the recognition of decrees based on a foreign assumption
of jurisdiction substantially similar to a local basis of jurisdiction
a void marriage. For if we are right in our view that there should be no
restrictions on the jurisdiction of English courts to annul a void marriage,
the analogy of Travers v. Holley might logically require English courts to
recognise any foreign decree annulling a void marriage . This, of course,
is too sweeping a proposition to be acceptable, for, as Hodson L.J . said
in Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax, [19561 P. 115, 135, citing Sir William
Scott in Sinclair v. Sinclair (1798), 1 Hagg. Cons . 294, 297, `the conclusion
is carried too far when it is said that a sentence of nullity of marriage is
necessarily and universally binding in all countries.'"
5, Private International Law (5th ed ., 1957), p. 362.
ss S ee Lord Greene, M .R ., in De Reneville v. De Reneville, supra, footnote 9, at p. 60 (All E.R .) . In Re Rogers, Rogers v. Rogers (1963), 36
D.L.R . (2d) 661 (B .C .S.C.), aff'd (1963), 39 D.L .R . (2d) 141 (B .C.C.A .),
Ruttan J. said, at p. 666 : "Nowhere in the British Columbia Marriage Act,
R.S .B .C ., 1960, c. 232, is it laid down that previous void marriages must
be nullified by court order before one may apply for a marriage licence."
An order annulling a void marriage is declaratory only. It reaffirms an
existing status, it does not change or create a new one.
ae Op. cit., footnote 54, p. 358.
17 See Corbett v. Corbett, per Barnard J., supra, footnote 52.
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that statutorily extended the jurisdiction allowed at common law.
It is rather an equation of common law bases of jurisdiction for
the purpose of recognition of foreign decrees.
It is therefore submitted that in the circumstances it was wrong
and unnecessary to rely upon Travers v. Holley in order to find
that the Ontario "marriage" was a complete nullity and did not
have the effect of revoking the putative husband's will which was
therefore admitted to probate. This is not to say that the new
philosophy adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the field
of recognition of foreign decrees in matrimonial causes should be
rejected altogether . Comity or rather reciprocity in appropriate
cases facilitates the recognition of foreign decrees based on jurisdictional grounds similar to those upon which Ontario courts declare themselves competent. Actually it would be better not to
invoke reciprocity and frankly acknowledge that in Ontario conflict of laws rules are of a bilateral nature . There is little room for
a double standard in conflict of laws. As Professor Paul-A. Crdpeau
points out"' a coherent system of private international law should
normally contain bilateral rules" for two reasons (i) a very practical reason : a unilateral conflict rule solves but one half of the
problems (ii) a more theoretical reason : a bilateral rule expresses
an idea of equality and of confidence among states .
It must be noted that the Court of Appeal also stated :"
Once it is determined that the judgment of the foreign court was within
its jurisdiction, the court which is asked to extend recognition to such
judgment will not review the judgment of the foreign court to ascertain
if, e.g., the decision was supported by the evidence or was otherwise
erroneous unless, of course, the proceedings offend against our views
of substantial justice : Pemberton v . Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781 ; Jones v.
Smith, [192512 D.L.R. 790, 56 O.L .R . 550 ; Igra v . Igra, [1951] P. 404 .

To the authorities cited should be added Formosa v. Formosasl
and Lepre v. Lepre .sz It is clear that today, in England and in Ontario, when the recognition of a foreign decree is involved, jurisdiction is decisive and the fact that the court of the domicile pronounced the decree on grounds which are not part of the domestic
law of the country in which recognition is sought, is not of itself
ea Introduction to Comparative Private International Law (1964), p. 13.
ss A unilateral rule is one in which the connecting factor is so specific
that the rule can only apply to a certain category of conflictual situations
localized either in the forum or abroad. A bilateral rule is one in which
the connecting factor is so general or broad that the rule can apply to
conflictual situations whether localized in the forum or abroad. Paul A.
Cr6peau, op. tit., pp . 12-13.
s" Supra, footnote 1, at p. 96 .
61 [196213 All E.R. 419 (C.A.).
sz Supra, footnote 50, See also Bater v. Bater, [1906] P. 209 (divorce
case).
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a ground for dismissal of the action as long as the foreign decree
is not collusive or otherwise fraudulent and does not offend against
the forum ideas of substantial justice.
TV
The last part of the judgment is also of great interest although
obiter dictum . The Court of Appeal relying on a long line of authorities in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada. in the field of divorces'
expressed the opinion that a wife cannot attack the validity of a
nullity decree obtained by her from a court the jurisdiction of
which she herself invoked. The court was not prepared to overrule
cases that had been relied upon for many years in Ontario and
adopt the views expressed in Burtfiel v. Burnfiel 64 unless forced
to do so by a court of higher jurisdiction . The court also disregarded
a statement of principle made by Duff C.J. in Stephens v. Falchi,sb
a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, on the ground that
it did not apply to the facts of the present case.
Schroeder J.A . speaking of the putative wife said : 16

She elected to change her domicile to one of the United States of
America and there secured a decree of nullity with any and all advantages which might flow from it. She married her present husband

66 Swaizie v. Swaizie (1899), 31 O.R . 324 ; Re Williams and Ancient
Order of United Workmen (1907), 14 O .L.R. 482, aff'd. at p . 486 ; Re Banks
(1918), 42 O .L.R . 64 ; Re Hodgins (1920), 18 O .W.N. 231 ; Re Lavis, [1959]
O.W .N . 291 ; Carter v . Patrick, [1935] 2 D .L.R . 811, 49 B.C.R . 411, [1935]
1 W.W .R. 383 ; Re Graham Estate, Nolan v. Graham (1937), 52 B.C.R . 481,
[193713 W.W .R. 413 ; Burpee v. Burpee, [1929] 3 D.L .R. 18, 41 B .C.R. 201,
[192912 W .W .R. 128 ; Re Plummer, (Plummer v. Sloan), [1942] 1 D.L .R.
34, [194113 W.W.R. 788 (Alta . C .A .) .
64
[19261 2 D .L.R . 129, [1926] 1 W.W.R. 657 (Sask. C.A .). Recently
in Fife v . Fife (1965), 49 D .L .R. (2d) 648 (Sask . Q .B .) the applicant domiciled at all times in Saskatchewan went to Nevada accompanied by the
respondent. After having fulfilled the six weeks' residence period required
by Nevada law, he obtained a divorce and on the same day married the
respondent. The following day they returned to Saskatchewan where they
lived together until the applicant left the respondent . The latter brought
proceedings for and was awarded maintenance as a deserted wife under
the Deserted Wives' and Children's Maintenance Act, R .S.S ., 1953, c.
305 . The magistrate found that the respondent was the wife of the applicant for the purpose of the Act and that he was estopped from denying the validity of the divorce which he himself had obtained . On appeal,
Bence, C .J .Q.B ., relying on Lamont J .A .'s opinion in Burnfrel v . Burnfiel
held that the Nevada divorce could not be recognized as valid in Saskatchewan and that the applicant was not precluded or estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the foreign court, at least where the respondent was fully aware of the true situation as was the applicant, and there
was no representation made by him on which the respondent acted to
her prejudice . The marriage between the applicant and respondent was null
and void ab initio and the latter had no status as wife to maintain an aciion for maintenance .
66 [193813 D .L .R. 590, at p . 595, [1938] S .C .R. 354, at pp . 361-362.
66 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 100 ..
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under the protection of that decree and doubtless she was living with
her new spouse at the time of the testator's death, and they may be
still cohabiting . She publicly repudiated her marriage with the testator
in the most formal and solemn manner possible in the nullity suit instituted by her in Nevada, acted upon the decree thus obtained, and with
startling inconsistency she now lays claim upon the major portion of
his estate by reason of that very marriage. If she were now permitted
to impeach the validity of that decree and her present contentions were
to prevail, it would, to my mind, constitute a parody of justice .

It seems to be beyond controversy that if a divorce is decreed
by a foreign court without jurisdiction, the fact that one of the
spouses has invoked the jurisdiction and that the other has submitted to it does not preclude or estop any of them from afterwards
asserting that the divorce is a nullity so far as their status as husband
and wife is concerned. In other words the consent or submission
of one or both ofthe spouses to the jurisdiction of the foreign court
will not prevent a subsequent marriage of one of them from being
bigamous and therefore void."
There has, however, been a great difference of opinion in Canada on the question whether a person who obtains an invalid
foreign divorce, or submits to the jurisdiction of the court which
grants the divorce, is later on precluded or estopped from claiming
as husband or wife against the estate of his or her deceased spouse .
In Re Plummer, (Plummer v. Sloan)," decided by the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta, a woman obtained a
divorce in the State of Washington notwithstanding that her husband was domiciled in Alberta, and upon her husband's death
claimed a share in .his estate in Alberta as his widow. Although the
foreign divorce was obviously invalid in Alberta, Harvey C.J., and
67 Stephens v. Falchi, supra, footnote 63, overruling Stevens v.
Fisk
(1885), Cameron S.C. 392, esp. per Ritchie C .J., at p. 416 . Gordon S. Cowan
(1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 57, at p. 59, referring to the case said : "The effect
of the statement of Ritchie C.J. : . . . is that, although the foreign court may
have acted without jurisdiction and the resulting divorce decree is therefore
invalid here according to the rules of English conflict of laws, a party who
has submitted to the foreign jurisdiction may be prevented from setting up
that invalidity. As against him the divorce decree will be effective, but it
will not be valid and effective as against third parties who are not so prevented from setting up its invalidity, e.g., the Crown in a prosecution for
bigamy (R. v. Woods (1903), 6 O .L.R. 41, 23 C.L.T. 220, 7 C.C.C. 226
(C.A.) W. & H. obtained a collusive divorce in Michigan which was invalid since they were domiciled in Ontario . W. was convicted of bigamy.
Cf. if W. had claimed dower on the death of Ii. In re Hodgins (1920), 18
O.W.N. 231 .), or a second wife who has married in ignorance of the invalid divorce (Drake v . MacLaren, [1929] 3 D.L.R. 159, Mitchell J.A.
(Alta .)) ." Note that in Stevens v . Fisk the person alleging the invalidity of
the divorce was the defendant in the foreign suit while in most cases it is
the foreign plaintiff who denies that the foreign court had jurisdiction.
66 Supra, footnote
63.
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three other judges held that having invoked the jurisdiction of the
VVashington court she could not now be heard to question the
existence of thatjurisdiction and contend that the foreign judgment
obtained by her was invalid. The analogy adopted by the majority
of the court was to a foreign judgment in personam as far as her
claim as widow was concerned. The decision was similar in effect
to Carter v. Patrick" in which a husband who had obtained an
invalid divorce was not allowed to claim a share in his wife's estate
on death. In Re Plummer, Ford J.A ., dissented from the majority
of the court, 7° relying chiefly on the judgments of Lamont, J.A .,
in Burnftel v. Burnfiel 7 t and on Duff, C.J., in Stephens v. Falchi. 72
In the latter case Duff C.J., said that "consent on the part of the
spouses to the exercise of jurisdiction is of no significance", and
pointed out that the status of the patties to the first marriage as
husband and wife was not affected by the invalid divorce obtained
by the wife or by the subsequent putative marriage of the wife with
the respondent. Actually in Stephens v. Falchi the Supreme Court
of Canada had only to decide the question whether the putative
husband had a valid claim against the estate of his putative wife
on her death. The court was not asked to determine, as in Re
Plummer,73 whether a wife who gets an invalid divorce may as
widow claim against the estate of her deceased husband.
It is difficult to follow the reasoning by which a wife who obtains a divorce or a nullity decree from a foreign court is entitled
for one purpose and not for another to assert that the court had
no jurisdiction and that the decree is invalid. If the proceedings
purporting to affect the status of the parties are in rem, consent or
submission of the patties cannot confer jurisdiction on the foreign
court : the parties to the foreign decree or judgment are still husband and wife. If the husband dies and his wife claims a share in
his estate, it is submitted that even for this purpose the invalid
foreign judgment in rem cannot be considered as a valid judgment
in personam rendered on the basis of the consent or submission of
the parties especially because the right to inherit flows from status .
It must be invalid for all purposes . 74 Without contending that the
70 Ibid., at p . 37 (D.L .R.).
Supra, footnote 64.
Supra, footnote 65 . See also C. v . C. (1917), 39 O .L .R . 571 .
73 Supra, footnote 63.
7' In Hayward v . Hayward, (1961] P . 152, (1961] 1 All E .R. 236, it was
held that the doctrine of estoppel does not preclude a party to a bigamous
ceremony of marriage from alleging it to be null and void even though he
had previously asserted its validity in judicial proceedings. No conflict of
laws was involved . Phillimore J . said at pp . 158-159 (P .), 241-242 (All E .R.) :
"It seems to me that it would be contrary to all principle if a ceremony,
11
71
12

Ibid.
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foreign judgment is in personam, it has been argued that a person
who as plaintiff obtains the foreign divorce or nullity decree, as
distinguished from a person who as defendant merely submitted
to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, should not be allôwed to
claim an advantage, such as the right to succeed on the death of
his or her spouse, which is inconsistent with the divorce or nullity
decree obtained as plaintiff. The distinction was drawn in the case
of Re Rlummer 76 and seems to have been approved by the courts
in several other cases76 It would be better for the courts to abandon
these various approaches to the problem and openly recognize
that it is againt the public policy of the forum to give the plaintiff
in a foreign suit the right to impugn the validity of the decree,
obtained on his own motion, in order to gain some advantage here.
This view finds strong support in Mr. Justice Schroeder's reference
to "a parody ofjustice" . 77
To conclude, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
the present ease appears to be basically sound but some lawyers
will no doubt be slightly dismayed by the method followed in
arriving at the desired result . The court should certainly be congratulated for its liberal and humane attitude with respect to the
recognition of foreign decrees, an attitude in conformity with the
which is by definition null and void, could be converted into something
valid and binding and capable of conferring status by the act or inaction of a party to it. It would surely be remarkable as a proposition of
law if this court were to be prevented from declaring the truth, namely,
that a marriage is bigamous and so correcting the status of parties to
it and of their dependants merely because one or both of them had
chosen to assert its validity or because one of them had failed to dispute
or had concurred in the assertion of its validity by the other.
This court deals not merely with disputes between parties but with
status . . . . It is an old maxim that estoppels are odious because they
tend to shut out the truth . . . and it is well settled that they cannot
override the law of the land. . . . I think . . . [the court] must declare the
truth, now that the truth is known, and then correct the error, just as
it has to do if, for example, judgment is obtained against a party that
does not exist."
Cf. l'. M. Bromley, Family Law (2nd ed., 1962), pp. 62-63, who distinguishes estoppel by conduct and per rem judicatum .
75 Supra, footnote 63.
76 See Re Graham Estate, ibid
. and comment by Gordon S. Cowan,
loc. cit ., supra, footnote 67 ; Re Lavis, supra, footnote 63, and comment by
Joan Robinette Sadleir (1960), 38 Can . Bar Rev. 90 ; Swaizie v . Swaizie,
ibid., Re Williams and Ancient Order of United Workmen, ibid. ; Re Banks,
ibid. ; Re Jones (1961), 25 I .L.R. (2d) 595 (B.C.).
77 do Detro v. Aetro (1922),
70 I .L.R . 61 (Alto.) Simmons J. said, at

p. 64 : "It is quite obvious that it would be a-scandalous proceeding for a
party to obtain a decree of divorce in one jurisdiction and attempt to
renounce or escape from the effects of the same in a proceeding in another
jurisdiction ; but I am not able to apply the same reasoning to a decree
which goes no further than judicial separation and an allowance for
support."
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present spirit of international co-operation in the field of conflict
of laws. What Canada really needs is comprehensive legislation
dealing with matrimonial causes generally .
J.-G. Castel*

CRIMINAL LAW-ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA-SPECIAL PLEAS
IN BAR-FINDINGS IN PREVIOUS CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.-On
March 22, 1962, three accused, F, M and W, were charged on two
counts . The first count, on which they were acquitted, charged a
conspiracy, in agreeing to give corruptly money to a peace officer
contrary to section 101(b) of the Criminal Code.' The second count
charged a conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose, that is to obtain
from the police officer information which it was his duty not to
disclose . The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Feely, McDermott
& Wright s held that a plea of autrefois acquit was not available on
the second count since the two conspiracies were distinct . The first
conspiracy involved an agreement to commit an illegal act under
section 101(b) and all the elements of that offence had to be proved ;
the second conspiracy had nothing to do with bribing an officer to
interfere with the course of justice. This was so, even if the two
conspiracies covered the same transaction .
The unanimity of the Supreme Court stopped there. Judson,
Taschereau and Fauteux JJ. held further that res judicata was not
available since there were no necessary and definite factual (or
legal) findings implicit in a verdict of acquittal on the first count
*J.-G. Castel, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
I S.C ., 1953-54, c. 51. Section 101 provides as follows:
Every one who
(a) being a justice, police commissioner, peace officer, public officer, or
officer of a juvenile court, or being employed in the administration of
criminal law, corruptly
(i) accepts or obtains,
(ii) agrees to accept, or
(iii) attempts to obtain,
for himself or any other person any money, valuable consideration, office,
place or employment with intent
(iv) to interfere with the administration of justice,
(v) to procure or facilitate the commission of an offence, or
(vi) to protect from detection or punishment a person who has committed or who intends to commit an offence ; or
(b) gives or offers, corruptly, to a person mentioned in paragraph (a) any
money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment with intent
that the person should do anything mentioned in subparagraph (fv), (v)
or (vi) of paragraph (a),
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen
years.
- (1963] S.C.R. 539, 40 C.R. 261, 40 D.L.R. (2d) 563, 3 C.C.C. 201 .

